Tuesday, February 15, 2005
Why Guest Worker Visas are Unethical
President Bush has been gearing up for the campaign to create a guest worker visa. For those of you who aren't aware, this is entirely different from a green card or citizenship. The idea is that the visa would have a number of months for which it is valid (open to extension of course), and at the end of that period the "guest worker" goes back to his/her country of origin. This program is a clear response to population pressure from Latin America. Everyone is aware of the huge numbers of illegal immigrants that come to work in the U.S. every year, and any reasonable person is aware of the huge amounts of manpower wasted on trying to prevent it, manpower better devoted to stopping terrorists and drug trafficking. The administration seeks to relieve that pressure through means of the guest worker visa. Here's the catch: Guest worker visas are an old European scheme to allow cheap labor to flow in while still preventing it from integrating culturally and economically into the society. And the real kicker is that you can simply stop visa extensions when you need to pull an Ebeneezer Scrooge and "decrease the surplus population." Problem: Preventing integration with the society creates a socio-economic underclass (usually hostile to their hosts), deports GDP by means of remittances (cash immigrants send home), and (by means of the slums that these immigrants live in) creates areas prone to crime. The other nasty problem is that you can't deport this problem any more effectively than you can stop illegal immigrants from entering the country. In fact, it's harder because they're already here, living in urban slums with offline economies and surrounded by people in a similar plight. The trend in these cases has never been for families and friends to reunite back in their country of origin, but to reunite in the host nation. The creation of a disenfranchised sub-citizenry might relieve population pressure to some extent, but in the end it will only import a new set of problems. Given the choice between waging a futile border war now, a futile internal war later, or allowing working men and women living in America to be part of our multi-cultural fabric I choose the latter option.
Thursday, February 10, 2005
Joke of the Day
Earlier today, Donald Rumsfeld found a good use for the Powell Doctrine as applied to relations within NATO. After what was generally smooth going at a press conference in Nice, France, the Secretary looked to top aide Lawrence di Rita saying, "Are we getting close to the end, Larry? I'd like to get out of here before I make a mistake."
Maybe he should teach Condi this tactic before her next hardline chat about Iran.
Maybe he should teach Condi this tactic before her next hardline chat about Iran.
Tuesday, February 01, 2005
The Moral High Ground
After commenting on our own social welfare situation, this just makes my day. Apparently Germany, by legalizing prostitution, has created a situation in which brothels must be treated in the same manner as any other employer, meaning that if a person recieving unemployment benefits turns down a job as a prostitute, they risk having their benefits terminated. Oh, feel free to take all the moral high ground on Iraq you'd like, Gerhardt. Or, should I say, O.G. Pimp Daddy Schroder. I'm going to get SOOOO much mileage out of that at parties.
Monday, January 31, 2005
When Idealism is in our Self-Interest
William Saffire put the president's inauguration speech in the top ten second term inaugural in history. I haven't read all the second term speeches, but I might've been inclined to give it even more prominence than that on the grounds of the singular statement:
We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.
It would seem that the Bush administration has grasped that policy is most successful when idealism and self-interest intersect, or, rather, that they have grasped this with regard to foreign policy. While this rather subtle nuance of politics (frequently lost on academics) seems to have become the core idea of Bush's foreign policy, the president seems to have failed to comprehend that old adage: "What's good for the goose is good for the gander."
Over the past weeks innumerable editorials have been published regarding the budgetary evisceration of social welfare programs, and, clearly, this is in keeping with ideas popular among Republicans since Reagan, but it is in direct opposition to both our ideals and our interests. As we pour money and manpower into the Iraqi reconstruction, even going so far as to daily sacrifice America's sons and daughters on the altar of freedom and global community, the administration would have us believe that our own disconnected areas are somehow fundamentally different from Sadr City, that our freedom and security are connected to slums in Baghdad, but not to slums in Detroit.
Allow me to put this into perspective. If the Bush doctrine, or some revised form of it, is successful, by 2020 there will be a functioning economy, a middle class, and prosperity in the Middle East. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine will no longer be fruitful recruiting ground for Jihadists. Indigenous populations, focused on building a future, riding steadily forward on a sense of possibility and increased expectations will shun Jihad in favor of moderate forms of Political Islam, geared toward building a better future for the Islamic world. However, as can already be seen in Western Europe, Islamic communities abroad will face discrimination, finding themselves in squalor amid the prosperous. Imagine the Black Panthers emboldened with Jihadist ideology and a lot of Simtex.
The very social programs that are designed to prevent indigenous Americans from sliding into crushing poverty are America's first line of defense against the Jihadists of tomorrow. While most Americans don't realize it, America's Islamic population is surging. In Dearborne, Michigan 30% of the population is of Arab ancestry, more than 60,000 people, most of them living in disconnected and impoverished communities. Already anti-American demonstrations have had a chilling effect.
In the coming years the survival of liberty in our land will depend increasingly on the survival of our commitment to opportunity for all Americans. Social welfare is our first line of defense against the Jihadists of tomorrow. Isn't it in our interests then, to ensure it's survival?
We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.
It would seem that the Bush administration has grasped that policy is most successful when idealism and self-interest intersect, or, rather, that they have grasped this with regard to foreign policy. While this rather subtle nuance of politics (frequently lost on academics) seems to have become the core idea of Bush's foreign policy, the president seems to have failed to comprehend that old adage: "What's good for the goose is good for the gander."
Over the past weeks innumerable editorials have been published regarding the budgetary evisceration of social welfare programs, and, clearly, this is in keeping with ideas popular among Republicans since Reagan, but it is in direct opposition to both our ideals and our interests. As we pour money and manpower into the Iraqi reconstruction, even going so far as to daily sacrifice America's sons and daughters on the altar of freedom and global community, the administration would have us believe that our own disconnected areas are somehow fundamentally different from Sadr City, that our freedom and security are connected to slums in Baghdad, but not to slums in Detroit.
Allow me to put this into perspective. If the Bush doctrine, or some revised form of it, is successful, by 2020 there will be a functioning economy, a middle class, and prosperity in the Middle East. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine will no longer be fruitful recruiting ground for Jihadists. Indigenous populations, focused on building a future, riding steadily forward on a sense of possibility and increased expectations will shun Jihad in favor of moderate forms of Political Islam, geared toward building a better future for the Islamic world. However, as can already be seen in Western Europe, Islamic communities abroad will face discrimination, finding themselves in squalor amid the prosperous. Imagine the Black Panthers emboldened with Jihadist ideology and a lot of Simtex.
The very social programs that are designed to prevent indigenous Americans from sliding into crushing poverty are America's first line of defense against the Jihadists of tomorrow. While most Americans don't realize it, America's Islamic population is surging. In Dearborne, Michigan 30% of the population is of Arab ancestry, more than 60,000 people, most of them living in disconnected and impoverished communities. Already anti-American demonstrations have had a chilling effect.
In the coming years the survival of liberty in our land will depend increasingly on the survival of our commitment to opportunity for all Americans. Social welfare is our first line of defense against the Jihadists of tomorrow. Isn't it in our interests then, to ensure it's survival?
Saturday, January 29, 2005
Rule Set Reset
The first issue of Rule Set Reset: A Journal of News and What's Next will be available free of charge, and, given the wonderful articles by Thomas P. M. Barnett, TM Lutas, Mark Safranski, and yours truly I highly recomend that you all download it.
Monday, January 24, 2005
How Little We Understand Ourselves
- 'Land grab' fears for Jerusalem, BBC World News, Jan. 24, 2005
It has been broadly accepted that the root cause of terrorism is "a sense of diminished expectations," and economist Hernando de Soto, President of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, has done extensive work connecting that feeling to what he refers to as property "meta-rights," or the right to have property rights. With Ariel Sharon molting his hawk's feathers it seems strange that his new government should be assaulting these rights shown to be most connected to that sense of diminished expectations. That's exactly what they're doing, however, when Palestinians, living in the West Bank who can actually prove their ownership of property in East Jerusalem, are losing property to the government under an absentee landlord law not in active use for fifty years. Sharon's political life has been bet on one hand of poker with the Palestinians. Is he really stupid enough to trade in a pair of jacks in hopes of a flush? For the peace process to succeed the Palestinians have to have hope. This marks two serious strikes against him (the first being the early shut down of communications with the Abbas government). Let's hope that he and his new government can get their act together and comprehend that a mutually beneficial agreement doesn't mean that they get all the land, power, and prosperity alongside the peace.
It has been broadly accepted that the root cause of terrorism is "a sense of diminished expectations," and economist Hernando de Soto, President of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, has done extensive work connecting that feeling to what he refers to as property "meta-rights," or the right to have property rights. With Ariel Sharon molting his hawk's feathers it seems strange that his new government should be assaulting these rights shown to be most connected to that sense of diminished expectations. That's exactly what they're doing, however, when Palestinians, living in the West Bank who can actually prove their ownership of property in East Jerusalem, are losing property to the government under an absentee landlord law not in active use for fifty years. Sharon's political life has been bet on one hand of poker with the Palestinians. Is he really stupid enough to trade in a pair of jacks in hopes of a flush? For the peace process to succeed the Palestinians have to have hope. This marks two serious strikes against him (the first being the early shut down of communications with the Abbas government). Let's hope that he and his new government can get their act together and comprehend that a mutually beneficial agreement doesn't mean that they get all the land, power, and prosperity alongside the peace.
Friday, January 21, 2005
A Citizen Of Mosul
A Citizen Of Mosul has decided to give us some perspective on Iraqi history. I rarely blog links to other blogs, but this one's worth it.
Tuesday, January 18, 2005
Jazz and Policy
The fundamental difference between be-bop jazz and most forms of music that preceded it is that be-bop leaves room for dissonance and improvisation. In be-bop a trumpet player can go off melody and beat, creating wildly dissonant patterns. I love be-bop... as a form of music. Be-bop, however, is not a bureaucratic or political style that goes over too terribly well. That, according to an article in The Nation, hasn't stopped it from being tried as we struggle to create a future for Iraq.
I'll spare you the particulars of the article. Andrew Ackerman already wrote them, so I'll simply give you the necessary bits. According to Ackerman the Pentagon has awarded a nearly $3M contract for the protection of diplomats in Iraq to Aegis Defence Services, a London-based mercenary firm headed by the notorious Tim Spicer. Spicer is widely known in military circles as one of the most scandalous and disreputable men in a field that is hardly overburdened by ethics. The reason he is "widely known" is that he has, historically, been less than discreet while engaging in very questionable activities. He has previously violated international and British law by trafficking arms into Sierra Leone, accidentally triggered a coup in Paupa New Guinea, and, while commanding a Scots Guard unit in Belfast, allowed men guilty of murder to return to duty.
Five senators, led by Ted Kennedy, have lodged a protest with the Department of Defense to no avail. Protests raised by competitors to the GAO have had similar results. Simply put, Spicer's company meets all the bureaucratic requirements to be awarded the contract, and, frankly, were this a traditional war zone, I would think this a perfectly reasonable situation. War zones, however, are no longer traditional. The United States is, for better or worse, trying to build a free and modern state where once there was a despotism. This task must be taken personally. Every leader involved must share, or at least comprehend, the vision of a free Iraq. For the Department of Defense to outsource security duties to conflict-prone mercenaries is tantamount to the conductor of an orchestra allowing a trumpet player to go off melody during an Aaron Copeland symphony. Be-bop, it turns out, simply doesn't sound good as policy.
I'll spare you the particulars of the article. Andrew Ackerman already wrote them, so I'll simply give you the necessary bits. According to Ackerman the Pentagon has awarded a nearly $3M contract for the protection of diplomats in Iraq to Aegis Defence Services, a London-based mercenary firm headed by the notorious Tim Spicer. Spicer is widely known in military circles as one of the most scandalous and disreputable men in a field that is hardly overburdened by ethics. The reason he is "widely known" is that he has, historically, been less than discreet while engaging in very questionable activities. He has previously violated international and British law by trafficking arms into Sierra Leone, accidentally triggered a coup in Paupa New Guinea, and, while commanding a Scots Guard unit in Belfast, allowed men guilty of murder to return to duty.
Five senators, led by Ted Kennedy, have lodged a protest with the Department of Defense to no avail. Protests raised by competitors to the GAO have had similar results. Simply put, Spicer's company meets all the bureaucratic requirements to be awarded the contract, and, frankly, were this a traditional war zone, I would think this a perfectly reasonable situation. War zones, however, are no longer traditional. The United States is, for better or worse, trying to build a free and modern state where once there was a despotism. This task must be taken personally. Every leader involved must share, or at least comprehend, the vision of a free Iraq. For the Department of Defense to outsource security duties to conflict-prone mercenaries is tantamount to the conductor of an orchestra allowing a trumpet player to go off melody during an Aaron Copeland symphony. Be-bop, it turns out, simply doesn't sound good as policy.
Sunday, January 09, 2005
Sorry for the Absence
My apologies for the long absence. I'd like to blame it on the holidays, and I suppose I can to an extent. I get terribly depressed around this time of year, and (combined with a nasty case of the flu) that kept me down for a couple of weeks. It was all I could manage to finish my article for Rule Set Reset (the monthly journal of the New Rule Sets Project). I'm quite happy about that. I consider having a 1000 word article next to articles by Thomas P.M. Barnett, TM Lutas, and Mark Safranski (Zenpundit) to be an honor. I'm still trying to figure out exactly why Tom asked me to write for them, but, hey, I'll take the exposure without asking too many questions.
Tom and Critt, thanks for asking me to be involved. Bob Jacobson, thanks for the outstanding coaching and editing. I'm proud to have worked with you.
If it's quite all right with the NRSP kids I'll post the article here when the Feb. issue of RSR comes out. Assuming that I keep getting a soap box in RSR, I'll try to publish the articles here as the following issues come out.
Esther Dyson and Jeff Jarvis on NPR
I hope at least some of you managed to listen to Esther Dyson and Jeff Jarvis on NPR this morning. There was some really serious insight into how the Internet (and blogs in particular) are changing everything from disaster relief to the media. It was all the guff that bloggers already know, but it demonstrated that NPR has really begun to get globalization. I also particularly like that a major media outlet is giving play to serious blogs, and that Wonkette's flirtation with a certain Capitol Hill hussy will no longer be the way that outsiders remember blogs.
The New Year
The calender insists that this is a new year, but I view time as a series of events rather than just a series of dates. So, by my reckoning it's New Year's Eve. About three hours ago the Palestinians started voting. Since I count the Tsunami (and the initial flow of aid) as the final event of 2004, I'm counting the Palestinian elections, or rather their completion, as the first major event of 2005. When the votes are in and a successor to Yassir Arafat has been declared, I'll call it '05. Get ready for a high bit rate for the next few weeks. The Tsunami pulled the vast majority of media and policy attention for a couple of weeks, but this election and the begining of this session of Congress are going to start a massive flow of pent up political energy. I'll save my immediate predictions as they're all fairly obvious, but I suppose I'll make a few big ones for '05.
1) Sharon's shaky government will collapse and the Palestinian peace process will require the intervention of an outside negotiator. Sharon will survive politically, but he probably won't be the PM. This will all happen after the settlement pullouts are largely complete, and the trigger will be budgetary in nature.
2) The attention that the Tsunami has brought to the Tamil Tigers will draw a third party negotiator to help bring about an end to that conflict. The Tigers will gain enough legitimacy in international eyes to become more of a political party and less of an insurgency.
3) Costal areas hit by the Tsunami will rebuild rapidly. By 2006 they will contribute at least double their previous percentages of their respective GDPs on average. These regions will attract massive investment due to the restructuring of local property laws and the creation of new physical infrastructure.
4) Iraq will be headed for trifurcation, though it will remain Iraq. The national government will exist, but it will serve as little more than a political battleground for the three regions to argue over oil rights. While the Shiites continue to stabilize and prosper the Sunnis will wage an undeclared civil war. We will, in response, train a largely Shiite military which will further alienate the Sunnis. The end result will be a bloody conflict management which will not improve until the peacekeeping force is made significantly more multi-lateral. The violent conflict in Iraq will only improve when continental Europe gets off its high horse and helps. That in turn will only happen when the Bush and Blair administrations ask politely. We might be waiting until 2007 for that. Another possibility is that the Islamic world, led by Turkey and Iran, will stage a serious effort to bring about peace in Iraq, but that sort of help will be linked (indirectly) to Turkey's EU ambitions and Iran's bomb.
5) The European Union will deal with more homegrown Islamic terrorism than ever before, prompting leaders to involve Europe more deeply in the Global War on Terror. This could prompt reconcilliation between the US and Europe over Iraq if Bush plays his cards right. As Europe will find itself the new home of massive terror networks, the epicenter of this reconcilliation will likely be interagency cooperation between US and European intel agencies. This one's an outside bet, but I'll still throw some cash on it.
6) This will be a weak year for national domestic policy due to massive partisan debate in Congress. The Hill will be full of sound and fury signifying nothing, but state governments will use the chance to seize the limelight, starting a decentralization of power. The rising stars of both parties will come from state governments, dashing the hopes of more than a few members of the House for political advancement.
That's all I'll predict for'05. This is going to be a tedious year in a lot of ways. Very little will come to fruition, but we'll see the emergence of quite a few patterns. Oh, one last one, North Korea will implode with less fanfare than expected. China will deal with that handily enough that the US barely gets involved until after the dice for the future of the country are already thrown.
Well, we'll just put that on to simmer for a year, and we'll see how well my crystal ball works later. Time for me to crawl back into my bottle of NyQuil. See you all after the votes are counted in Palestine.
Tom and Critt, thanks for asking me to be involved. Bob Jacobson, thanks for the outstanding coaching and editing. I'm proud to have worked with you.
If it's quite all right with the NRSP kids I'll post the article here when the Feb. issue of RSR comes out. Assuming that I keep getting a soap box in RSR, I'll try to publish the articles here as the following issues come out.
Esther Dyson and Jeff Jarvis on NPR
I hope at least some of you managed to listen to Esther Dyson and Jeff Jarvis on NPR this morning. There was some really serious insight into how the Internet (and blogs in particular) are changing everything from disaster relief to the media. It was all the guff that bloggers already know, but it demonstrated that NPR has really begun to get globalization. I also particularly like that a major media outlet is giving play to serious blogs, and that Wonkette's flirtation with a certain Capitol Hill hussy will no longer be the way that outsiders remember blogs.
The New Year
The calender insists that this is a new year, but I view time as a series of events rather than just a series of dates. So, by my reckoning it's New Year's Eve. About three hours ago the Palestinians started voting. Since I count the Tsunami (and the initial flow of aid) as the final event of 2004, I'm counting the Palestinian elections, or rather their completion, as the first major event of 2005. When the votes are in and a successor to Yassir Arafat has been declared, I'll call it '05. Get ready for a high bit rate for the next few weeks. The Tsunami pulled the vast majority of media and policy attention for a couple of weeks, but this election and the begining of this session of Congress are going to start a massive flow of pent up political energy. I'll save my immediate predictions as they're all fairly obvious, but I suppose I'll make a few big ones for '05.
1) Sharon's shaky government will collapse and the Palestinian peace process will require the intervention of an outside negotiator. Sharon will survive politically, but he probably won't be the PM. This will all happen after the settlement pullouts are largely complete, and the trigger will be budgetary in nature.
2) The attention that the Tsunami has brought to the Tamil Tigers will draw a third party negotiator to help bring about an end to that conflict. The Tigers will gain enough legitimacy in international eyes to become more of a political party and less of an insurgency.
3) Costal areas hit by the Tsunami will rebuild rapidly. By 2006 they will contribute at least double their previous percentages of their respective GDPs on average. These regions will attract massive investment due to the restructuring of local property laws and the creation of new physical infrastructure.
4) Iraq will be headed for trifurcation, though it will remain Iraq. The national government will exist, but it will serve as little more than a political battleground for the three regions to argue over oil rights. While the Shiites continue to stabilize and prosper the Sunnis will wage an undeclared civil war. We will, in response, train a largely Shiite military which will further alienate the Sunnis. The end result will be a bloody conflict management which will not improve until the peacekeeping force is made significantly more multi-lateral. The violent conflict in Iraq will only improve when continental Europe gets off its high horse and helps. That in turn will only happen when the Bush and Blair administrations ask politely. We might be waiting until 2007 for that. Another possibility is that the Islamic world, led by Turkey and Iran, will stage a serious effort to bring about peace in Iraq, but that sort of help will be linked (indirectly) to Turkey's EU ambitions and Iran's bomb.
5) The European Union will deal with more homegrown Islamic terrorism than ever before, prompting leaders to involve Europe more deeply in the Global War on Terror. This could prompt reconcilliation between the US and Europe over Iraq if Bush plays his cards right. As Europe will find itself the new home of massive terror networks, the epicenter of this reconcilliation will likely be interagency cooperation between US and European intel agencies. This one's an outside bet, but I'll still throw some cash on it.
6) This will be a weak year for national domestic policy due to massive partisan debate in Congress. The Hill will be full of sound and fury signifying nothing, but state governments will use the chance to seize the limelight, starting a decentralization of power. The rising stars of both parties will come from state governments, dashing the hopes of more than a few members of the House for political advancement.
That's all I'll predict for'05. This is going to be a tedious year in a lot of ways. Very little will come to fruition, but we'll see the emergence of quite a few patterns. Oh, one last one, North Korea will implode with less fanfare than expected. China will deal with that handily enough that the US barely gets involved until after the dice for the future of the country are already thrown.
Well, we'll just put that on to simmer for a year, and we'll see how well my crystal ball works later. Time for me to crawl back into my bottle of NyQuil. See you all after the votes are counted in Palestine.
Monday, December 27, 2004
Rugby V. Football: The Future of War
When I was in the army my battalion commander was from a West Texas football town. If you've ever seen Varsity Blues then you know that Football is everything in West Texas. Conveniently for my BC football has been everything for the Army for some time, as well. The concept of rushing troops across terrain, making an end-run for Baghdad, is simply appealing. Throw in a complex series of rules, a pile of armor, and... wait, I'm confused. Are we talking about football or war?
It's easy to see how this model for warfare came to be. It's the 1980's, fourth quarter of the Cold War, and the Eagles are up on the Bears by a field goal. Both teams line up along the line of scrimmage (a.k.a. Iron Curtain), and Pentagon commanders call plays. The bad news is that the Bears conceded victory on that one, so we never got to see the mother of all superbowls. Instead we had to settle for Iraq I, but that's okay because Stormin' Norman was even good enough to name his strategies after football plays. Between that and CNN cum ESPN (of war) the first Iraq war was better than watching the UT Vols during the Peyton Manning years.
Fast forward a decade. Same basic strategy. Roll 'em up across the desert. Baghdad's the goal line. Woohoo! Touchdown! Wait, why aren't they running off the field? Oops. This is a rugby match. If you've ever clicked over to ESPN 2 at 1 AM then you've seen rugby. It's what football was during the Precambrian period, back when the other popular sport was dinosaur jousting. The basic idea is that the ball stays in play. Forward passes are against the rules, so no gaining ground quick. You've gotta run the ball. There are no downs, no field goals, no punts, just a bunch of guys playing offense and defense at the same time, constantly trying to adjust to the other team and passing backwards in order to get a shot at a few steps forward. Sound like fourth generation warfare? Oh, and these guys don't wear helmets.
Any further comparison would be pointless. The last thing I want to do here is convince anyone that rugby is the way to think about war. What I do want to do is to make the point that in order to prevail in this conflict we must shake ourselves of the mindset that there are periods of down time, that we could conceivably call a time out, and that running the ball to the goal line warrants a silly dance. Like rugby, this game is constantly in play, and there is no easy way to get to the other end of the field.
It's easy to see how this model for warfare came to be. It's the 1980's, fourth quarter of the Cold War, and the Eagles are up on the Bears by a field goal. Both teams line up along the line of scrimmage (a.k.a. Iron Curtain), and Pentagon commanders call plays. The bad news is that the Bears conceded victory on that one, so we never got to see the mother of all superbowls. Instead we had to settle for Iraq I, but that's okay because Stormin' Norman was even good enough to name his strategies after football plays. Between that and CNN cum ESPN (of war) the first Iraq war was better than watching the UT Vols during the Peyton Manning years.
Fast forward a decade. Same basic strategy. Roll 'em up across the desert. Baghdad's the goal line. Woohoo! Touchdown! Wait, why aren't they running off the field? Oops. This is a rugby match. If you've ever clicked over to ESPN 2 at 1 AM then you've seen rugby. It's what football was during the Precambrian period, back when the other popular sport was dinosaur jousting. The basic idea is that the ball stays in play. Forward passes are against the rules, so no gaining ground quick. You've gotta run the ball. There are no downs, no field goals, no punts, just a bunch of guys playing offense and defense at the same time, constantly trying to adjust to the other team and passing backwards in order to get a shot at a few steps forward. Sound like fourth generation warfare? Oh, and these guys don't wear helmets.
Any further comparison would be pointless. The last thing I want to do here is convince anyone that rugby is the way to think about war. What I do want to do is to make the point that in order to prevail in this conflict we must shake ourselves of the mindset that there are periods of down time, that we could conceivably call a time out, and that running the ball to the goal line warrants a silly dance. Like rugby, this game is constantly in play, and there is no easy way to get to the other end of the field.
A Full Stocking a Day Late
I just wrote a massive post on a host of good news, but my computer crashed. So, in lieu of rewriting the entire thing I'll hit the main points and call it a night.
Palestine is looking good to go on elections with Israel pulling out troops to ensure that polling is seen as fair. So long as Hammas the political party can either reign in or divorce itself from Hammas the suicide bombers the new government stands a good chance of being seen as legitimate by both the Palestinians and the international community. Let's see if it can leap the bureaucratic and legislative hurdles that all new governments face.
Go Yuschenko!!! Get ready to see a more European Ukraine.
Afghanistan is pulling together a new opposition party by internationally normal methods. I call that a big win. Who was it at Foreign Policy Magazine that decided to run that title "Why Democracy Won't Save the Middle East?" Howsabout "Why Pessimism Won't Save the Middle East?"
If I can get gifts like this I'll wait until the 26th every year!
Palestine is looking good to go on elections with Israel pulling out troops to ensure that polling is seen as fair. So long as Hammas the political party can either reign in or divorce itself from Hammas the suicide bombers the new government stands a good chance of being seen as legitimate by both the Palestinians and the international community. Let's see if it can leap the bureaucratic and legislative hurdles that all new governments face.
Go Yuschenko!!! Get ready to see a more European Ukraine.
Afghanistan is pulling together a new opposition party by internationally normal methods. I call that a big win. Who was it at Foreign Policy Magazine that decided to run that title "Why Democracy Won't Save the Middle East?" Howsabout "Why Pessimism Won't Save the Middle East?"
If I can get gifts like this I'll wait until the 26th every year!
How Fleixible is Asia?
One of the major defining characteristics of a functional, decentralized network is its flexibility. South Asia has just suffered a catastrophic loss of human life and property. Over the coming weeks the predictible aid will flow in from the EU, US, and NGOs, but I predict that India may be more able to deal with this crisis than they are being given credit for. A truly amazing turn of events would be a massive Chinese aid response, though I won't be holding my breath. If those two nations want to flex some international muscle this is the time. They're undisputed powers in numerous areas. Now it's time to see how they respond to crisis management in their own backyard.
Friday, December 24, 2004
Happy Holidays
Okay, so I've been accused of having a heart three sizes too small this time of year. I generally don't do too well with Christmas, but I just wanted to wish all of our servicemen and women overseas, in combat zones, on ships, and pulling guard duty all night in the cold a safe and uneventful holiday weekend. It's never a Merry Christmas when you're standing in a guard tower for 12 hours and you're scared to look at your thermometer, but I just want to remind everyone to think of those men and women. The desert gets cold at night, and even colder when you're ten thousand miles from home.
Thursday, December 23, 2004
Speak Plainly
I have at various times in the last three years stood by several very different opinions with regard to America's attempt to police the Middle East. Let's go ahead and call a spade a spade. That's what we're doing. We're policing a bad neighborhood. In Iraq today there are innumerable factions divided between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, theocrats, technocrats, tribalists, Baathists, Islamists, and probably at least one political satirist. What I'd like to point out is that if America stands for anything, if we want the lives of our dead soldiers to mean anything we must ensure that we leave Iraq with these groups, nay, these individuals, represented in some form of democratically elected government.
We, have sent our men and women in uniform into harms way to eliminate a totalitarian regime, and have found ourselves involved in a prolonged conflict. My patience for hearing ivory tower academics denounce the war in its entirety is exhausted. Certainly criticism of officials managing the war strategy, both military and political, is appropriate, even patriotic, however it is unpatriotic in the highest order to insinuate that a pullout from Iraq, after having destabilized that region, is appropriate. I call it cowardly. I call it cowardly because it is irresponsible, shortsighted, and because those prominent columnists who insinuate that we should execute such a "strategy" do so under the guise of bold criticism for the administration. We now owe it to the people of Iraq, Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and all, to leave them with at least more stability and security than they had when we came.
I propose a new code for op-ed journalism, a very simple rule to follow: If you don't like it, offer a solution. Simply stating that something is evil, dangerous or ineffectual after the fact simply doesn't cut the mustard for quality journalism. Maureen Dowd, someone whose writing I have hithertofore admired, has, among widely circulated columnists, been most guilty of breaking this rule. Maureen, like it or not, we're in a war. If you can't offer solutions then give your rather prominent space in the Times to someone who can. I wonder if after rear-ending someone you would feel the need to give a twenty minute denouncement of traffic patterns and your own driving before exchanging insurance information. It strikes me that Ms. Dowd would be willing to leave Iraq in the hands of Baathist militants, a group who, as her counterpart Thomas Friedman points out, have been begged to come to the table of democracy and declined in favor of what amounts to gang violence. I'm afraid, Maureen, that two wrongs don't make a right. Leaving Iraq in its present state would definitely constitute a second wrong.
We, have sent our men and women in uniform into harms way to eliminate a totalitarian regime, and have found ourselves involved in a prolonged conflict. My patience for hearing ivory tower academics denounce the war in its entirety is exhausted. Certainly criticism of officials managing the war strategy, both military and political, is appropriate, even patriotic, however it is unpatriotic in the highest order to insinuate that a pullout from Iraq, after having destabilized that region, is appropriate. I call it cowardly. I call it cowardly because it is irresponsible, shortsighted, and because those prominent columnists who insinuate that we should execute such a "strategy" do so under the guise of bold criticism for the administration. We now owe it to the people of Iraq, Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and all, to leave them with at least more stability and security than they had when we came.
I propose a new code for op-ed journalism, a very simple rule to follow: If you don't like it, offer a solution. Simply stating that something is evil, dangerous or ineffectual after the fact simply doesn't cut the mustard for quality journalism. Maureen Dowd, someone whose writing I have hithertofore admired, has, among widely circulated columnists, been most guilty of breaking this rule. Maureen, like it or not, we're in a war. If you can't offer solutions then give your rather prominent space in the Times to someone who can. I wonder if after rear-ending someone you would feel the need to give a twenty minute denouncement of traffic patterns and your own driving before exchanging insurance information. It strikes me that Ms. Dowd would be willing to leave Iraq in the hands of Baathist militants, a group who, as her counterpart Thomas Friedman points out, have been begged to come to the table of democracy and declined in favor of what amounts to gang violence. I'm afraid, Maureen, that two wrongs don't make a right. Leaving Iraq in its present state would definitely constitute a second wrong.
Wednesday, December 22, 2004
Congratulations!
Congrats to Tom Barnett and Critt Jarvis on their new consulting firm The New Rule Sets Project! The Project will also have a monthly journal based around Tom's stellar foreign policy work called Rule Set Reset to which Tom's asked me to contribute. I have to say, I can't imagine what they're thinking (must be all the stress from the new business), but I'll give them whatever I've got. If we're in a war of ideas, these guys are the Delta Force of network-oriented thought, moving heaven and earth for a future worth creating. Cheers, boys!
The News Matrix
Critt Jarvis and I have been discussing a "News Matrix," or a way to graphically represent the data we collect every day. I'm sure that some of you are already familiar with the concept of pattern recognition, or noticing trends in news and society that let you know what's going to happen. It's a useful skill, but one that's difficult to teach because it requires a worldview paradaigm and an intuitive grasp of data analysis. We feel that a graphic aid would be helpful in explaining our ideas to others, perhaps even providing a piece of software that would allow people without the intuitive grasp to perform the analysis.
There's a discussion going on Critt's blog about this.
There's a discussion going on Critt's blog about this.
Surprise!
Well, everybody said that the Kremlin was going to end up in control of Yukos. Everybody said that Baikal was a front. Surprise! Everybody was right, but nobody expected it to go down this quick.
Damn, Vladamir, you puttin' the smackdown on that free trade bullshit WWF style!
Score one for the bad guys.
Damn, Vladamir, you puttin' the smackdown on that free trade bullshit WWF style!
Score one for the bad guys.
Monday, December 20, 2004
A Certain Breed of Arrogance
This morning I'm feeling saucy, so, having just spent the evening defending my globalist viewpoints against an assault of Kaplan and Huntington quotes, I'd like to make a very broad and very firm statement. Simply put, it takes a certain breed of arrogance to firmly believe that within one's own lifetime some massive, tectonic shift in the function of the world will occur. This is why Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" and Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy" are tantamount to Chicken Little's "The Sky is Falling," with their implications of a radically altered world, shaped by the ravaging forces of chaos and the imperial might of the U.S. military (and dollar).
The world is an ever more complex place than that. There will be no titanic struggle between Good and Evil for the fate of the world fought on pay-per-view. My apologies to the cable networks. I know you were banking on that one. Instead of a "clash" I think we can expect more of a "mild friction" as two imperfectly matched networks try to aggregate. The struggle between Good and Evil? I'm afraid it will be somewhat Biblical. Oh, I mean Biblical like Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John Biblical, not Revelation. Biblical as in personal, interpersonal, and very, very human. I'm afraid that the images of John Wayne singlehandedly taking down Osama, thus bringing about peace on Earth will have to wait for the DVD edition of the 21st century. For now, we'll have to content ourselves with slowly, haltingly working towards "a future worth creating."
The world is an ever more complex place than that. There will be no titanic struggle between Good and Evil for the fate of the world fought on pay-per-view. My apologies to the cable networks. I know you were banking on that one. Instead of a "clash" I think we can expect more of a "mild friction" as two imperfectly matched networks try to aggregate. The struggle between Good and Evil? I'm afraid it will be somewhat Biblical. Oh, I mean Biblical like Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John Biblical, not Revelation. Biblical as in personal, interpersonal, and very, very human. I'm afraid that the images of John Wayne singlehandedly taking down Osama, thus bringing about peace on Earth will have to wait for the DVD edition of the 21st century. For now, we'll have to content ourselves with slowly, haltingly working towards "a future worth creating."
Sunday, December 19, 2004
Good Will Gestures for the Holiday Season
Well Santa Claus sure just hit up the Palestinians and the Chinese. Sharon (the bionic man of Israeli politics) and his new buddies at Labor are putting their new deal on paper, so the pullout is looking good. The Israeli's are tossing in 170 Palestinian prisoners (the non-violent type) to sweeten the deal, and Hammas' Gaza faction is even backing peace talks. Christmas is looking good for the Arab-Israeli conflict, a little too good. I'd be ready for the hiccups to start early in the new year. Hammas' other factions aren't so ready to deal as Gaza is, and they'll be likely to voice their opinion with semtex. There's still a lot of budgetary stress in the Israeli government, so I'm still standing by my theory that that'll be the weak link on Israel's side of the fence. Sharon's driving this bus right now, and he's got a lot of support, but there should definitely be some third party structure going on. Mr. President, get in or get somebody else in! Somebody's gotta sweeten the deal for everyone involved, just like the trade deal for Egyptian-Israeli cooperative products.
In China there's yet another carefully worded change of policy on free expresion. Now, according to the Chinese government, you can believe whatever you want and people can't discriminate against you for your beliefs! Careful about how you exercise them, though, that's still regulated. The moral here, though, is that China is testing the waters about freedom of religion. This move is going to spark religious activity (or rather, did spark), and how that activity progresses will determine Beijing's future actions, a Sun Tzu approach to domestic policy.
Hmm... maybe that'll be good for article fodder... yes... excellent... my plans for world domination are coming along nicely.
In China there's yet another carefully worded change of policy on free expresion. Now, according to the Chinese government, you can believe whatever you want and people can't discriminate against you for your beliefs! Careful about how you exercise them, though, that's still regulated. The moral here, though, is that China is testing the waters about freedom of religion. This move is going to spark religious activity (or rather, did spark), and how that activity progresses will determine Beijing's future actions, a Sun Tzu approach to domestic policy.
Hmm... maybe that'll be good for article fodder... yes... excellent... my plans for world domination are coming along nicely.
Saturday, December 18, 2004
Irony in Buenos Aires
There's some irony in the fact that global warming talks are being held in B.A. That said, this round of talks may have more impact than Kyoto could've ever hoped to have. The Bush administration has been wildly criticized for not signing Kyoto, and I'll admit that I was on that bandwagon. However, there may be some boons for the future in the rejection of that particular treaty. Bush's main objection is that it didn't constrain the "developing nations" of China and India, creating an unfair trade advantage. While China and India are emerging economies, their frail attempt to hide behind the "developing nation" title is absurd. Yes, they're in the middle of their respective industrial revolutions and tech revolutions. Yes, they will have to operate under looser rule sets than we do to continue their development. No, they're not under that "developing nations" umbrella with Pakistan and Ghana.
Now, at the moment, imposing a massive rule-set on those two nations would be disasterous, but at the rate they're trying to connect up to the global network, they'll be needing those rules very soon. In order to be effective any global treaty on pollution is going to have to include the two largest populations on earth. As usual, a graduated shift is in order, but, as governments are wont to do, it's an all or nothing deal. 2012 is the slated date for the expiration of the Kyoto Accord, and that's probably about the time we'll want to put pressure on those states to adopt more stringent rules regarding pollutants. China's not too far behind the power curve already. It's rules on cars are quite strict, but while the rules in place are apropriate, the rules don't encompass enough of their polluters. I imagine that much of this situation will be remedied internally by 2012, paving the way for more globally relavent agreements.
Now, at the moment, imposing a massive rule-set on those two nations would be disasterous, but at the rate they're trying to connect up to the global network, they'll be needing those rules very soon. In order to be effective any global treaty on pollution is going to have to include the two largest populations on earth. As usual, a graduated shift is in order, but, as governments are wont to do, it's an all or nothing deal. 2012 is the slated date for the expiration of the Kyoto Accord, and that's probably about the time we'll want to put pressure on those states to adopt more stringent rules regarding pollutants. China's not too far behind the power curve already. It's rules on cars are quite strict, but while the rules in place are apropriate, the rules don't encompass enough of their polluters. I imagine that much of this situation will be remedied internally by 2012, paving the way for more globally relavent agreements.
Sunday, December 12, 2004
Softly With A Big Stick
Today's NY Times article on the Iran nuke situation carried some interesting connotations. The most eye catching was in a comparison to the Iraqi nuclear program at Osirak, destroyed by Israel in 1981. It reads:
"Iran takes great care to protect its technology and production/storage capability with multiple layers of security, hardening and dispersal," said one Air Force general with experience in the Middle East. "All this complicates identification, targeting and execution."
What's fascinating about this analysis is that these are not characteristics of an unstable R&D program. The level of coordination required to pull off this kind of decentralized effort signals two very important things. The first is a highly functional bureaucracy, necessary for prolonged operation of a decentralized network. Rogue elements like terrorist organizations can operate on a network-oriented model by utilizing infrastructure that is already extant (phones and internet) and because they are driven by the zeal of their members, requiring little bureaucracy to function. Government R&D programs require complex bureaucratic structures in order to transfer information, pay staff, and coordinate operations. "Multiple layers of security, hardening and dispersal..." are not something that can be accomplished without a stable, functional bureaucracy. I'll say more on this later.
The second point to be made by this analysis is that Iran hardly presents a major threat to global nuclear security. Any government (be it a democracy or a theocracy) going to these lengths to secure a program isn't going to be inclined to distribute its secrets to the highest bidder. Iran's main concern is Iranian security and stability. Distributing nuclear technology to terrorist groups or unstable regimes would seriously undermine both, almost assuring economic, political, and military backlash.
The really good news in this is that Iran is sporting a functional, and probably fairly massive, political bureaucracy. Couple that with a fairly well-educated population and an economy that swings some lumber regionally, and you're looking at a lot of network infrastructure in the making. Networking means connectivity, and connectivity inevitably leads to communication. This in turn leads to a free-market for ideas, and once you've got that truly representative government is on the way.
Don't get me wrong. I'm not suggesting that we should just let Iran have the nukes and expect them to become a democracy afterwards. That's absurd. What I am suggesting is that because of Iran's capacity to develop an extensive nuclear program that we can't readily eliminate (or even cripple) Iran is probably further down the road to being a democracy than even they know. Insofar as the nukes go, keeping international political pressure on them is definitely the best route, but avoiding economic sanctions is probably wise. That would do little but stifle those aspects of Iranian civil society and government that we would most like to foster. A stable Middle East requires a regional power that can be both feared and respected by its neighbors. Excluding EU bound Turkey, Iran is the only Middle Eastern nation that can be expected to be both by 2020. An Iranian nuke is a big stick to look at, but it's that soft, steady walk that should be drawing our eye.
"Iran takes great care to protect its technology and production/storage capability with multiple layers of security, hardening and dispersal," said one Air Force general with experience in the Middle East. "All this complicates identification, targeting and execution."
What's fascinating about this analysis is that these are not characteristics of an unstable R&D program. The level of coordination required to pull off this kind of decentralized effort signals two very important things. The first is a highly functional bureaucracy, necessary for prolonged operation of a decentralized network. Rogue elements like terrorist organizations can operate on a network-oriented model by utilizing infrastructure that is already extant (phones and internet) and because they are driven by the zeal of their members, requiring little bureaucracy to function. Government R&D programs require complex bureaucratic structures in order to transfer information, pay staff, and coordinate operations. "Multiple layers of security, hardening and dispersal..." are not something that can be accomplished without a stable, functional bureaucracy. I'll say more on this later.
The second point to be made by this analysis is that Iran hardly presents a major threat to global nuclear security. Any government (be it a democracy or a theocracy) going to these lengths to secure a program isn't going to be inclined to distribute its secrets to the highest bidder. Iran's main concern is Iranian security and stability. Distributing nuclear technology to terrorist groups or unstable regimes would seriously undermine both, almost assuring economic, political, and military backlash.
The really good news in this is that Iran is sporting a functional, and probably fairly massive, political bureaucracy. Couple that with a fairly well-educated population and an economy that swings some lumber regionally, and you're looking at a lot of network infrastructure in the making. Networking means connectivity, and connectivity inevitably leads to communication. This in turn leads to a free-market for ideas, and once you've got that truly representative government is on the way.
Don't get me wrong. I'm not suggesting that we should just let Iran have the nukes and expect them to become a democracy afterwards. That's absurd. What I am suggesting is that because of Iran's capacity to develop an extensive nuclear program that we can't readily eliminate (or even cripple) Iran is probably further down the road to being a democracy than even they know. Insofar as the nukes go, keeping international political pressure on them is definitely the best route, but avoiding economic sanctions is probably wise. That would do little but stifle those aspects of Iranian civil society and government that we would most like to foster. A stable Middle East requires a regional power that can be both feared and respected by its neighbors. Excluding EU bound Turkey, Iran is the only Middle Eastern nation that can be expected to be both by 2020. An Iranian nuke is a big stick to look at, but it's that soft, steady walk that should be drawing our eye.
Thursday, December 09, 2004
Where Do I Sign?
The November 3rd Theses
This pretty much rounds out what I've been saying about the Dems. Wonder why I didn't see this earlier.
This pretty much rounds out what I've been saying about the Dems. Wonder why I didn't see this earlier.
Gay for Pay?
New Zeland's parliament just passed a controversial bill to legalize same-sex marriage. Ever since this debate heated up in the U.S. it's been on the rise in other countries as well. (See: Canada 'Can Permit Gay Marriage' BBC News UK Ed.) Most notable among states legislating protections for same-sex couples (and unmarried straight couples) is Singapore. Notorious for its intolerance of personal freedoms, Singapore's push for GLBT legislation is, well, strange.
The reason is that Singapore (and several of these other nations I imagine) is interested in capitalizing on America's strangely hostile climate for homosexuals. Depending on who you cite anywhere between 2 and 10 percent of the American population is gay. (Kinsey pulls out the top end at 10, but 6 is a more reasonable figure.) Avoiding all of the traditional stereotypes about homosexuals (even the one about good taste in shoes), what that means for NZ, Singapore, and possibly Canada is that those homosexuals with the means, especially couples, will be inclined to consider moving to and working in those nations. Singapore's GLBT movement outright admits that it wasn't a human rights victory, but a free enterprise victory.
Tighter top-down controls on a population isn't conducive to the free spread of ideas, which isn't conducive to capitalism. I'm not suggesting that all of America's gay population is going to move to Singapore. What I am suggesting is that the most creative, most adventurous, and possibly wealthiest of the GLBT population in the United States will find themselves with a decision to make about where they want to make their home. That decision will become decidedly easier as U.S. states pass gay marriage bans and lovely little Pacific islands attach pink triangles to their flags.
The reason is that Singapore (and several of these other nations I imagine) is interested in capitalizing on America's strangely hostile climate for homosexuals. Depending on who you cite anywhere between 2 and 10 percent of the American population is gay. (Kinsey pulls out the top end at 10, but 6 is a more reasonable figure.) Avoiding all of the traditional stereotypes about homosexuals (even the one about good taste in shoes), what that means for NZ, Singapore, and possibly Canada is that those homosexuals with the means, especially couples, will be inclined to consider moving to and working in those nations. Singapore's GLBT movement outright admits that it wasn't a human rights victory, but a free enterprise victory.
Tighter top-down controls on a population isn't conducive to the free spread of ideas, which isn't conducive to capitalism. I'm not suggesting that all of America's gay population is going to move to Singapore. What I am suggesting is that the most creative, most adventurous, and possibly wealthiest of the GLBT population in the United States will find themselves with a decision to make about where they want to make their home. That decision will become decidedly easier as U.S. states pass gay marriage bans and lovely little Pacific islands attach pink triangles to their flags.
Not Until You're Older
- "South America Creates Single Market,"
BBC News UK Ed. Thursday, 9 December, 2004, 03:13 GMT
More connectivity. More international agreement. Less focus on dealing with their individual lack of infrastructure. This is only good if South America can, as a whole, integrate the massive extralegal economies that exist in its individual states. Brazil is making good strides, and I'm sure that Argentina and Chile are trying as well. But, really, does anyone delude themselves into thinking that because Bolivia is managing its first peaceful (and legitimate) election and Colombia is begining to have great connectivity to the U.S. where extradition of drug lords is concerned that they'll be ready to join a union of states akin to the EU or US by the time that Argentina or Brazil will be? The loosening of trade restrictions in South America has far too many smuggling ramifications at present to be reasonable. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are fighting to be part of the global economy. They won't be ready to serve as three pillars of a South American currency by 2020. One passport? Do you want Brazilians and Colombians to have equal access worldwide?
This is a giant step that the South American governments are taking, and they're taking it in their dad's oversized shoes. There's gonna be some slipage and maybe a fall or two. Is it overall bad? No. But it's definitely too soon to call this a success. This greater network that's being created won't be worth anything until the smaller networks beneath it are fully functional and able to go online. That said, it will be good for there to be a network structure there when these smaller networks are able to start the aggregation process, though I imagine it will be somewhat tired and defunct by then. Think "League of Nations" tired and defunct.
BBC News UK Ed. Thursday, 9 December, 2004, 03:13 GMT
More connectivity. More international agreement. Less focus on dealing with their individual lack of infrastructure. This is only good if South America can, as a whole, integrate the massive extralegal economies that exist in its individual states. Brazil is making good strides, and I'm sure that Argentina and Chile are trying as well. But, really, does anyone delude themselves into thinking that because Bolivia is managing its first peaceful (and legitimate) election and Colombia is begining to have great connectivity to the U.S. where extradition of drug lords is concerned that they'll be ready to join a union of states akin to the EU or US by the time that Argentina or Brazil will be? The loosening of trade restrictions in South America has far too many smuggling ramifications at present to be reasonable. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are fighting to be part of the global economy. They won't be ready to serve as three pillars of a South American currency by 2020. One passport? Do you want Brazilians and Colombians to have equal access worldwide?
This is a giant step that the South American governments are taking, and they're taking it in their dad's oversized shoes. There's gonna be some slipage and maybe a fall or two. Is it overall bad? No. But it's definitely too soon to call this a success. This greater network that's being created won't be worth anything until the smaller networks beneath it are fully functional and able to go online. That said, it will be good for there to be a network structure there when these smaller networks are able to start the aggregation process, though I imagine it will be somewhat tired and defunct by then. Think "League of Nations" tired and defunct.
Tuesday, December 07, 2004
Doing Things the Hard Way
Should we promote connectivity at any cost?
Thomas Barnett, a man whose opinion and insight I value greatly, posits that the Middle East's connection to the functional world through oil and natural gas provides a slender strand of connectivity on which to build, but I find this to be an imperfect linkage, destined to break. While I recognize the value of fossil fuel as an impetus to have some manner of connection with the source, I do not see that connecting an oil field to a major consumer requires the consent of the local populace or their participation. A global network must consist of innumerable tiny networks, networks of neighbors, networks based on common need. The connection of the Middle East to the more developed sectors of the world is flawed because there need be no real exchange, especially on the local level , only an extraction.
When dealing with many areas of the economic network there is an impetus to create stability. That impetus is "the long term," but with non-reneweable resources it is less of a factor for the simple fact that there is a forseeable end to the resources themselves, at least in a given form and geographic location. Certainly, the Middle East as a whole may have massive fossil fuel resources, however the long term stability of the entire region is not required to extract them, and it may in fact be less expensive to maintain the stability of a few oil platforms and buy concessions from "big man" type governments than to transform the region as a whole in "the long term."
It is for this reason that I believe that the Middle East will not likely be transformed by the intervention of nations largely interested in its natural resources, but by its more natural route of connectivity, Turkey. While we are clearly not intervening in Iraq for control of its oil reserves, our interest in the region as a whole is based on two things: oil and terrorism, or, more bluntly, greed and fear. I do not suppose to have an over-arching answer to the questions that this raises. I only wish to pose the question: "Should we build along the flawed link, or tear it down to create new, stronger ones? Can we do both at the same time?"
Balancing Act
Of course, networks are balancing acts of internal structuring and external forces, so while Turkey (hopefully as an EU member) provides the external connectivity to the developed world, Iran, I expect, will provide the internal structure to support that connectivity. Personally I do not forsee the obliteration of the Islamist regime in Iran the way many do. Instead I note that economic forces are forcing Iran to flirt with free-trade zones. Turkey's new government of moderate Islamists will provide a unique bridge between the Middle East and Europe as many policy analysts have noted. However, it is worth pointing out that the overthrow of the Ayatollahs is not really relavent to whether or not this bridge is functional. In fact, the functionality of that bridge is something that the West (note I do not say "developed world") should likely observe from a distance. That connectivity will be fostered through Islamists, not through secular capitalists. Being Islamist, after all, does not preclude being capitalist or interested in building a better future.
Our attempt to unilateraly create stability in Iraq is doomed. Our method of repairing the region resembles a man with a mallot striking a broken television in hopes that the picture will clear. This may work on the first or second attempt but after that... well... you know the old saying: "The definition of insanity is trying the same thing over and over expecting different results." As the dust settles from Fallujah and we near the promised deadline for elections we shall see if the striking has worked or if it is time for us to change tactics dramatically.
I believe that should we hope to stabilize the Middle East, the link provided by oil is irrelavent at best. Should we wish to bolster it we will take more resources, and energy (read: blood and treasure) than would be necessary to push the solution of a Turkish bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Dr. Barnett is fond of noting that no oil = no impetus. As usual, he's right, but the statement is somewhat misleading. The oil will continue to be the impetus for someone for a long time to come, whether it is China, India, or another nation going through its industrial revolution. To suggest that the West should maintain its dependence on Middle Eastern oil (something I believe Dr. Barnett does inadvertently) is somewhat strange. The developing world will increase its rate of consumption faster than we can decrease ours. If demand increases, the focus on oil as the link between the global network and the Middle East will increase as well, and it will not likely serve to bolster is so much as to draw focus away from other, more lasting links. No decent network engineer would design a global computer network with a huge portion linked only by one massive fiber. That doesn't support network stability.
The Illusion
The problem with thinking of oil as the first in a series of linkages, is that the link is really an illusion. There is no extant network to connect to, so the network cannot naturally aggregate. By pushing the "Turkish Bridge" scenario we grow connectivity at the same rate as the local networks. By insisting on maintaining our own independent link to the Middle East, we are struggling to create an artificial network with which to connect ourselves.
Removing Saddam Hussein was not a flawed concept. It was merely the execution (for reasons to oft discussed to repeat here) that was horrific. Now it is time that we accept that failure and move towards a natural trifurcation of Iraq. Turkey will be best suited to steward the North. Iran will naturally gain influence in the South. In the former case we should do all we can to foster this. In the latter, we should be prepared to cut deals and involve as many moderating forces as possible. If executed with deftness this could even serve as an oportunity to create another bridge into Iran, a more moderate statelet of similar makeup. If executed poorly, this could serve as a propaganda victory for extremists. The Sunni Triangle presents a challenge, and it will likely come in the form of a military one. The most important thing is to prevent it from doing damage to the two more stable regions.
The network will grow. Of this I am certain, but beware the flawed links and the urge to press forward when a step sideways is more productive. Even network-oriented thinkers are susceptible to tunnel vision sometimes.
Thomas Barnett, a man whose opinion and insight I value greatly, posits that the Middle East's connection to the functional world through oil and natural gas provides a slender strand of connectivity on which to build, but I find this to be an imperfect linkage, destined to break. While I recognize the value of fossil fuel as an impetus to have some manner of connection with the source, I do not see that connecting an oil field to a major consumer requires the consent of the local populace or their participation. A global network must consist of innumerable tiny networks, networks of neighbors, networks based on common need. The connection of the Middle East to the more developed sectors of the world is flawed because there need be no real exchange, especially on the local level , only an extraction.
When dealing with many areas of the economic network there is an impetus to create stability. That impetus is "the long term," but with non-reneweable resources it is less of a factor for the simple fact that there is a forseeable end to the resources themselves, at least in a given form and geographic location. Certainly, the Middle East as a whole may have massive fossil fuel resources, however the long term stability of the entire region is not required to extract them, and it may in fact be less expensive to maintain the stability of a few oil platforms and buy concessions from "big man" type governments than to transform the region as a whole in "the long term."
It is for this reason that I believe that the Middle East will not likely be transformed by the intervention of nations largely interested in its natural resources, but by its more natural route of connectivity, Turkey. While we are clearly not intervening in Iraq for control of its oil reserves, our interest in the region as a whole is based on two things: oil and terrorism, or, more bluntly, greed and fear. I do not suppose to have an over-arching answer to the questions that this raises. I only wish to pose the question: "Should we build along the flawed link, or tear it down to create new, stronger ones? Can we do both at the same time?"
Balancing Act
Of course, networks are balancing acts of internal structuring and external forces, so while Turkey (hopefully as an EU member) provides the external connectivity to the developed world, Iran, I expect, will provide the internal structure to support that connectivity. Personally I do not forsee the obliteration of the Islamist regime in Iran the way many do. Instead I note that economic forces are forcing Iran to flirt with free-trade zones. Turkey's new government of moderate Islamists will provide a unique bridge between the Middle East and Europe as many policy analysts have noted. However, it is worth pointing out that the overthrow of the Ayatollahs is not really relavent to whether or not this bridge is functional. In fact, the functionality of that bridge is something that the West (note I do not say "developed world") should likely observe from a distance. That connectivity will be fostered through Islamists, not through secular capitalists. Being Islamist, after all, does not preclude being capitalist or interested in building a better future.
Our attempt to unilateraly create stability in Iraq is doomed. Our method of repairing the region resembles a man with a mallot striking a broken television in hopes that the picture will clear. This may work on the first or second attempt but after that... well... you know the old saying: "The definition of insanity is trying the same thing over and over expecting different results." As the dust settles from Fallujah and we near the promised deadline for elections we shall see if the striking has worked or if it is time for us to change tactics dramatically.
I believe that should we hope to stabilize the Middle East, the link provided by oil is irrelavent at best. Should we wish to bolster it we will take more resources, and energy (read: blood and treasure) than would be necessary to push the solution of a Turkish bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Dr. Barnett is fond of noting that no oil = no impetus. As usual, he's right, but the statement is somewhat misleading. The oil will continue to be the impetus for someone for a long time to come, whether it is China, India, or another nation going through its industrial revolution. To suggest that the West should maintain its dependence on Middle Eastern oil (something I believe Dr. Barnett does inadvertently) is somewhat strange. The developing world will increase its rate of consumption faster than we can decrease ours. If demand increases, the focus on oil as the link between the global network and the Middle East will increase as well, and it will not likely serve to bolster is so much as to draw focus away from other, more lasting links. No decent network engineer would design a global computer network with a huge portion linked only by one massive fiber. That doesn't support network stability.
The Illusion
The problem with thinking of oil as the first in a series of linkages, is that the link is really an illusion. There is no extant network to connect to, so the network cannot naturally aggregate. By pushing the "Turkish Bridge" scenario we grow connectivity at the same rate as the local networks. By insisting on maintaining our own independent link to the Middle East, we are struggling to create an artificial network with which to connect ourselves.
Removing Saddam Hussein was not a flawed concept. It was merely the execution (for reasons to oft discussed to repeat here) that was horrific. Now it is time that we accept that failure and move towards a natural trifurcation of Iraq. Turkey will be best suited to steward the North. Iran will naturally gain influence in the South. In the former case we should do all we can to foster this. In the latter, we should be prepared to cut deals and involve as many moderating forces as possible. If executed with deftness this could even serve as an oportunity to create another bridge into Iran, a more moderate statelet of similar makeup. If executed poorly, this could serve as a propaganda victory for extremists. The Sunni Triangle presents a challenge, and it will likely come in the form of a military one. The most important thing is to prevent it from doing damage to the two more stable regions.
The network will grow. Of this I am certain, but beware the flawed links and the urge to press forward when a step sideways is more productive. Even network-oriented thinkers are susceptible to tunnel vision sometimes.
Monday, November 29, 2004
Pattern Recognition
I hate holliday weekends. There's always a bunch of crap about to happen in the world, and BANG the media takes four days to create "traditionally slow news days" as though the world actually turns a bit slower. Then, the following Monday is like a mad plunge into an icy pool of reality. Amid the flurry, a couple of major events are emerging in a pattern that I've been touting ever since I first noticed it.
China's taking ownership of Asean. By entering into a free-trade agreement (of which this is only a harbinger) with other Asean nations China will fulfill its own manifest destiny as the Asian Dragon. Networks, especially economic ones, tend to aggregate. According to Reed's Law the more utility the network provides the more users it attracts, and China, based on its user base and economic power, is a supermagnet. Here's the better news. As China, already constantly moving towards democracy and freedom, pulls more economies into its orbit it will be forced to loosen its restrictive government faster and faster. China will soon reach a critical mass of users and utility that will make it an economic/informational superpower. Don't get scared. Not only is this not likely to prompt too much military buildup, but as China deregulates its economy and society, Taiwan (our main point of contention) will likely slip into China's orbit naturally, without any military influence, becoming the Chinese equivalent of Puerto Rico.
Asia and Brazil, Sittin' in a Tree... Looks like the Pakistani have figured out the painfully obvious way to exploit their natural resources (something Europe and the US have shown minimal interest in). So, Brazil builds the infrastructure, Pakistan supplys the oil fields, and BANG new broadband connectivity between Asia and South America. If Brazil can get Pakistan to support its bid for a permaseat on the Security Council as part of the package then we're talking about the realization of major economic potential in Brazil. Of course, Brazil needs to speed up its own internal reforms (which it's been doing) to serve as a South American international economic hub. The US should largely sit this one out. This is going to be one of those fast and loose relationships that could only get mucked up by too much US/European involvement. Our systems are much too stable and regulated to route through. Good news is, with all the focus on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, we probably will.
Time for a new bid for PM. Sharon wasn't the guy to play peacemaker. I never had much hope that he'd pull off this dramatic shift of gears, but the good news is that the political infrastructure that he's created may be able to be used by a follow on. If he bites it over something so ordinary as a budget proposal, don't be fooled. It's because he's alienating his old allies and trying to make new ones out of old rivals. That's a tough bit for anybody. Let's just see how far he can run with the olive branch before somebody else has to pick it up.
More to come...
China's taking ownership of Asean. By entering into a free-trade agreement (of which this is only a harbinger) with other Asean nations China will fulfill its own manifest destiny as the Asian Dragon. Networks, especially economic ones, tend to aggregate. According to Reed's Law the more utility the network provides the more users it attracts, and China, based on its user base and economic power, is a supermagnet. Here's the better news. As China, already constantly moving towards democracy and freedom, pulls more economies into its orbit it will be forced to loosen its restrictive government faster and faster. China will soon reach a critical mass of users and utility that will make it an economic/informational superpower. Don't get scared. Not only is this not likely to prompt too much military buildup, but as China deregulates its economy and society, Taiwan (our main point of contention) will likely slip into China's orbit naturally, without any military influence, becoming the Chinese equivalent of Puerto Rico.
Asia and Brazil, Sittin' in a Tree... Looks like the Pakistani have figured out the painfully obvious way to exploit their natural resources (something Europe and the US have shown minimal interest in). So, Brazil builds the infrastructure, Pakistan supplys the oil fields, and BANG new broadband connectivity between Asia and South America. If Brazil can get Pakistan to support its bid for a permaseat on the Security Council as part of the package then we're talking about the realization of major economic potential in Brazil. Of course, Brazil needs to speed up its own internal reforms (which it's been doing) to serve as a South American international economic hub. The US should largely sit this one out. This is going to be one of those fast and loose relationships that could only get mucked up by too much US/European involvement. Our systems are much too stable and regulated to route through. Good news is, with all the focus on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, we probably will.
Time for a new bid for PM. Sharon wasn't the guy to play peacemaker. I never had much hope that he'd pull off this dramatic shift of gears, but the good news is that the political infrastructure that he's created may be able to be used by a follow on. If he bites it over something so ordinary as a budget proposal, don't be fooled. It's because he's alienating his old allies and trying to make new ones out of old rivals. That's a tough bit for anybody. Let's just see how far he can run with the olive branch before somebody else has to pick it up.
More to come...
The Idea Rises...
I'm hardly able to sleep these days. The Idea keeps getting larger, more defined, more... something. The Idea is that great, all encompasing model for a network-based universe. I see hydrogen molecules everywhere, my new basic symbol for mutual dependence, for the simplest of networks. In hydrogen (H2) each atom is in need of the other to remain somewhat stable. Every question that arises results in a network-based answer. A brief, and very civil, discussion of the abortion issue resulted in the question, "When does life begin for a child?" being raised. The answer: at division. At birth. A new nation exists when it divides out of the old national network that encompassed it. A new cell exists when it divides from the pre-existing one. I didn't like this answer much. I'd always liked to think that life began at some point, a gray area to be sure, before the third trimester in which conciousness was achieved. That answer doesn't hold water. It leaves more questions than answers, and none of those questions yield the answer either. Fortunately I can still skirt the abortion issue while holding my answer to be true, because simply defining a child as part of a mother until birth does not give the implicit right to abortion. (Depending on whether or not you're a libertarian, that is.) Anyway, the Idea rises.
I'm finding more network-centricists every day. I'm not even close to the only one, and I realized something today. We're reaching critical mass. Soon, we'll hear the jargon that we've been spewing at each other in ordinary conversation. Soon, our ideas on how to make politics more efficient will be reality. Take a look at this article from The Nation.
It's time to start writing. The Idea is mature enough. It's time to begin pruning the bonzai.
I'm finding more network-centricists every day. I'm not even close to the only one, and I realized something today. We're reaching critical mass. Soon, we'll hear the jargon that we've been spewing at each other in ordinary conversation. Soon, our ideas on how to make politics more efficient will be reality. Take a look at this article from The Nation.
It's time to start writing. The Idea is mature enough. It's time to begin pruning the bonzai.
Tuesday, November 23, 2004
FedEx vs. UPS: Network-Centricism and the Long View
It's been a long day of dealing with a family crises amid a host of deadlines and a travel schedule. Tonight, happily, I find myself largely caught up and just hanging around my parents' house with my laid-up-after-surgery step-father waiting on my old high school buddy and fellow political activist to get over here with the Chinese takeout. Rockstar.
While staying up until the wee hours of the morning helping a friend of mine out with a research paper I came to a nifty realization. The topic of the paper is irrelevant, but I came to realize something interesting while comparing FedEx and UPS as business entities. Both businesses are very successful and have bucked the last few years economic downturn. Strikes me that this says a lot about the market for connectivity which is fundamentally what the parcel service industry is about. Interestingly enough FedEx has done better over the long haul and with a great deal more consistency. I know that coincidence isn't causality, but I'd just like to point out that FedEx is built on an entirely network-centric business model from the operator to upper-management level, and that the company tends to grow like a network on all levels. UPS, which has many network-centric components utilizes a somewhat antiquated unionized workforce and seems to have a more stolid and traditional management structure. FedEx has incorporated many of the benefits of being a union employee into its corporate structure, and offset the slight sense of instability with a great potential for upward mobility, drawing its future managers from the line employees. Sparing you any further comparisons, it would seem that almost all market analysts are putting their money on FedEx. Granted that's FedEx to win and UPS to place, since the market for parcels is still emerging into the developing world and there's definitely room for Sharks and Jets in that town, but the money seems to be on FedEx based on one phrase: "Growth Potential." For reasons that never seem to be specified analysts (of many different types) say FedEx has more room to grow. Could it be that the network-centric model simply allows for unlimited potential growth whereas the top-down model eventually reaches a point of critical-mass at which it either divides or collapses? Is that why FedEx has more room to grow? True, both businesses are hybrids of the two models. To be an aggregate network model business FedEx would have to be a co-op, and UPS can't deliver packages efficiently without having a vast communications/transit network, but while UPS clearly draws the line between its business and how it runs it, FedEx seems to believe that networks... well... work. Given that FedEx dumps virtually all of its charitable donations into IT related education facilities it seems that they've even taken it upon themselves to bring about a more network-centric (and thus network-friendly) world. Who do you think has the long view in mind? I know where to bank my retirement money.
While staying up until the wee hours of the morning helping a friend of mine out with a research paper I came to a nifty realization. The topic of the paper is irrelevant, but I came to realize something interesting while comparing FedEx and UPS as business entities. Both businesses are very successful and have bucked the last few years economic downturn. Strikes me that this says a lot about the market for connectivity which is fundamentally what the parcel service industry is about. Interestingly enough FedEx has done better over the long haul and with a great deal more consistency. I know that coincidence isn't causality, but I'd just like to point out that FedEx is built on an entirely network-centric business model from the operator to upper-management level, and that the company tends to grow like a network on all levels. UPS, which has many network-centric components utilizes a somewhat antiquated unionized workforce and seems to have a more stolid and traditional management structure. FedEx has incorporated many of the benefits of being a union employee into its corporate structure, and offset the slight sense of instability with a great potential for upward mobility, drawing its future managers from the line employees. Sparing you any further comparisons, it would seem that almost all market analysts are putting their money on FedEx. Granted that's FedEx to win and UPS to place, since the market for parcels is still emerging into the developing world and there's definitely room for Sharks and Jets in that town, but the money seems to be on FedEx based on one phrase: "Growth Potential." For reasons that never seem to be specified analysts (of many different types) say FedEx has more room to grow. Could it be that the network-centric model simply allows for unlimited potential growth whereas the top-down model eventually reaches a point of critical-mass at which it either divides or collapses? Is that why FedEx has more room to grow? True, both businesses are hybrids of the two models. To be an aggregate network model business FedEx would have to be a co-op, and UPS can't deliver packages efficiently without having a vast communications/transit network, but while UPS clearly draws the line between its business and how it runs it, FedEx seems to believe that networks... well... work. Given that FedEx dumps virtually all of its charitable donations into IT related education facilities it seems that they've even taken it upon themselves to bring about a more network-centric (and thus network-friendly) world. Who do you think has the long view in mind? I know where to bank my retirement money.
Saturday, November 06, 2004
Reflections on Re-election
Well, I joined many Americans this week in my disappointment at the re-election of George W. For me it was partially the fear of what might happen under another four years of neoconservatism, but also the feeling that I'd just been sucker punched. Unlike many Kerry supporters of my generation I'm not suggesting that the election was stolen or fabricated. I don't think that the Diebold machines were all hacked or that hundreds of thousands of minorities were denied their right to vote. I don't think the Republicans had to do any of that. I think we were outplayed on a basic level. Their media campaigns were better. They sold their ideas in thirty second sound bytes. They adapted to the global information age, and, frankly, we didn't. Kerry supporters assumed that because their ideas were so much better for the country, their ideals so much more worthy of the greatest nation on earth that they would triumph. We were wrong.
The Republicans learned to sell George W. Bush as John Wayne. They sold values and a stern father. They sold steadfastness. It wasn't hard to fit that into the attention span of the average American, but it's nearly impossible to fit concepts like "making the war on terror multilateral" into a soundbyte. Kerry's mantra "fighting for the middle class" is just wrong from a sales perspective. No marketing exec worth his salt is ever going to include the word "middle" in something. The popularization of the prefix "mid" is thanks to marketing execs who want to avoid seeming boring in a society that values standing out. Further more, the middle class just doesn't sound like a group that needs fighting for. Would you ever say: "I'm fighting for the guys who aren't bad off, whose kids are all in college, and who just bought a new lawn mower." No, no you wouldn't.
It's time to get off our high-minded horses. It's time to get our hands dirty. In my home county of Shelby County, Tennessee we won. We turned a starkly divided county flat out blue. We mobilized minorities. We made sure that voting rights were protected. We politely asked people to listen. We didn't attack their ideas, but showed them how our ideas were compatible. We didn't approach people wearing Kerry buttons and waving flags. We waited until we heard conversations about "those ungrateful French" and then we talked about how frightened we were that the euro was getting stronger than the dollar under Bush. We asked what they were interested in and we told them how our ideas could help. We let pro-lifers be, and we didn't try to sell everyone on ideas that Bush had made controversial. We played his game, and here, in this little patch of racially charged politics, we won.
Now, we're getting organized. We came together for John Kerry, but we're staying together for each other and for you. We're keeping this going, not for ourselves, but for those we love and for those we've never met, for our soldiers, for our children, and for our future. Spero Meliora are the words on my family crest. They mean "Aspire to Better." We aspire to a future worth creating.
The Republicans learned to sell George W. Bush as John Wayne. They sold values and a stern father. They sold steadfastness. It wasn't hard to fit that into the attention span of the average American, but it's nearly impossible to fit concepts like "making the war on terror multilateral" into a soundbyte. Kerry's mantra "fighting for the middle class" is just wrong from a sales perspective. No marketing exec worth his salt is ever going to include the word "middle" in something. The popularization of the prefix "mid" is thanks to marketing execs who want to avoid seeming boring in a society that values standing out. Further more, the middle class just doesn't sound like a group that needs fighting for. Would you ever say: "I'm fighting for the guys who aren't bad off, whose kids are all in college, and who just bought a new lawn mower." No, no you wouldn't.
It's time to get off our high-minded horses. It's time to get our hands dirty. In my home county of Shelby County, Tennessee we won. We turned a starkly divided county flat out blue. We mobilized minorities. We made sure that voting rights were protected. We politely asked people to listen. We didn't attack their ideas, but showed them how our ideas were compatible. We didn't approach people wearing Kerry buttons and waving flags. We waited until we heard conversations about "those ungrateful French" and then we talked about how frightened we were that the euro was getting stronger than the dollar under Bush. We asked what they were interested in and we told them how our ideas could help. We let pro-lifers be, and we didn't try to sell everyone on ideas that Bush had made controversial. We played his game, and here, in this little patch of racially charged politics, we won.
Now, we're getting organized. We came together for John Kerry, but we're staying together for each other and for you. We're keeping this going, not for ourselves, but for those we love and for those we've never met, for our soldiers, for our children, and for our future. Spero Meliora are the words on my family crest. They mean "Aspire to Better." We aspire to a future worth creating.
Wednesday, October 27, 2004
While We Set Their VCR Clocks They Set Policy
While doing my daily skim through the Brookings Institute website I found this op-ed written by Shibley Telhami, a nonresident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy.
According to his resume Mr. Telhami should be among the foremost experts on the Middle East today, and that's what I'm going to talk about. Thomas Jefferson said that the Earth belongs to the generation that inhabits it. Never is this truth more clear than following a massive change in the global system, in this case the end of the Cold War. During the 1980's and 90's the economic world became a nightmare for business leaders who couldn't adapt to rapidly changing technology and international rule sets. For many executives learning to deal with the Japanese, email, and conference calling were simply tasks that couldn't be accomplished. Now, in the security and international policy realms we find ourselves in a similar situation.
While most Americans of my generation vaguely remember the Cold War the first formative images in international policy for most of us were the fall of the Berlin Wall and Gorbaychev's birthmark. Mr. Telhami's article belies his formative years doing duck and cover drills in school. Simply the terminology he uses implies that the old zero-sum game is in overtime. Mr. Telhami talks about "balance of power" and at one point compares a potential pullout of Iraq to the American pullout of Saigon, or more specifically he says, with reference to a retreat from Iraq potentially inciting Islamist militancy,
What? How is that relavent? I never read about any Maoist terrorists waging an asymetrical war against the U.S. during the 70's, nor were the Soviets likely to openly attack the U.S. after we'd pretty much agreed that Mutually Assured Destruction was the name of the paradigm in which we were living. For that matter, I'd like to point out that it wasn't long after the fall of Saigon that we were paying CIA clandestine services officers to train Osama bin Laden and give him stinger missles to fight the Ruskies. It's a brave new world! I digress.
For my part I am grateful in the extreme to Mr. Telhami's ilk for their part in making sure that I didn't grow up on the set of Mad Max. I don't want to be percieved as disrespectful, nor do I discount the gift of decades of experience. I just question the relavence of being a ski jump medalist in the summer Olympics. If Mr. Telhami represents the pinnacle of thought on the modern Middle East situation then we're in trouble. Thankfully he doesn't. We're fortuneate to have a number of people who have adapted to the paradigm that the fall of the Soviet Union has created, but the fact that this sort of article gets plastered on the front page of the Brookings website "above the crease" (visible without scrolling down) frightens me. While I certainly believe that institutions like Brookings are to be lauded for their ability to include varied viewpoints, I must say that this is evidence that the "wise old men" of our nation should really consider if they are prepared to accpet the challenges faced by a world map that looks a lot more like a diagram of the Internet overlapping a lava lamp than the old maps that ensorcelled the Soviet Union as though "Here be monsters".
The following is the email I sent Brookings:
I'm curious about the relavence of mr Telhami's discussion of "America's enemies, including the Soviets" not opting to attack the U.S. following the Saigon pullout in relation to inciting militancy by pulling out of Iraq. While considering the present in the context of history is, of course, imperative, viewing Iraq in the fame of a Cold War proxy war seems ridiculous. By the time Vietnam ended the MAD ruleset had not only been sold worldwide, it was on clearance at Wal-Mart. A more accurate comparison might be the Goths stepping up their raids into Roman territory following pullouts from northern outposts. While that comparison has obvious flaws, the psychology behind those raids and asymetrical attacks on U.S. soil are significantly more simmilar than Cold War containment/proxy wars versus pre-emtive warfare and stabilization operations. I'd be happy to entertain arguements, but that sort of thinking (i.e. Cold War type) is what keeps certain strategic factions within the Pentagon focused on China as the next emerging near-peer competitor. Sorry, the Manthorpe Curve is defunct, and it's time to define our world in much more complex terms than the zero sum game. This is more like playing the stock market than poker. Investments carry risks, but sometimes the riskiest investments can carry massive payoff. Last generations military decision makers were staring across a table at their opponent trying to guess what kind of hand he was holding. This generation's must be more like market analysts trying to determine what the payoff is and how long after investing before we call it a win or loss.
According to his resume Mr. Telhami should be among the foremost experts on the Middle East today, and that's what I'm going to talk about. Thomas Jefferson said that the Earth belongs to the generation that inhabits it. Never is this truth more clear than following a massive change in the global system, in this case the end of the Cold War. During the 1980's and 90's the economic world became a nightmare for business leaders who couldn't adapt to rapidly changing technology and international rule sets. For many executives learning to deal with the Japanese, email, and conference calling were simply tasks that couldn't be accomplished. Now, in the security and international policy realms we find ourselves in a similar situation.
While most Americans of my generation vaguely remember the Cold War the first formative images in international policy for most of us were the fall of the Berlin Wall and Gorbaychev's birthmark. Mr. Telhami's article belies his formative years doing duck and cover drills in school. Simply the terminology he uses implies that the old zero-sum game is in overtime. Mr. Telhami talks about "balance of power" and at one point compares a potential pullout of Iraq to the American pullout of Saigon, or more specifically he says, with reference to a retreat from Iraq potentially inciting Islamist militancy,
"America's enemies, including the Soviets, did not attack the United States once we abandoned Saigon and bared our defeat."
What? How is that relavent? I never read about any Maoist terrorists waging an asymetrical war against the U.S. during the 70's, nor were the Soviets likely to openly attack the U.S. after we'd pretty much agreed that Mutually Assured Destruction was the name of the paradigm in which we were living. For that matter, I'd like to point out that it wasn't long after the fall of Saigon that we were paying CIA clandestine services officers to train Osama bin Laden and give him stinger missles to fight the Ruskies. It's a brave new world! I digress.
For my part I am grateful in the extreme to Mr. Telhami's ilk for their part in making sure that I didn't grow up on the set of Mad Max. I don't want to be percieved as disrespectful, nor do I discount the gift of decades of experience. I just question the relavence of being a ski jump medalist in the summer Olympics. If Mr. Telhami represents the pinnacle of thought on the modern Middle East situation then we're in trouble. Thankfully he doesn't. We're fortuneate to have a number of people who have adapted to the paradigm that the fall of the Soviet Union has created, but the fact that this sort of article gets plastered on the front page of the Brookings website "above the crease" (visible without scrolling down) frightens me. While I certainly believe that institutions like Brookings are to be lauded for their ability to include varied viewpoints, I must say that this is evidence that the "wise old men" of our nation should really consider if they are prepared to accpet the challenges faced by a world map that looks a lot more like a diagram of the Internet overlapping a lava lamp than the old maps that ensorcelled the Soviet Union as though "Here be monsters".
The following is the email I sent Brookings:
I'm curious about the relavence of mr Telhami's discussion of "America's enemies, including the Soviets" not opting to attack the U.S. following the Saigon pullout in relation to inciting militancy by pulling out of Iraq. While considering the present in the context of history is, of course, imperative, viewing Iraq in the fame of a Cold War proxy war seems ridiculous. By the time Vietnam ended the MAD ruleset had not only been sold worldwide, it was on clearance at Wal-Mart. A more accurate comparison might be the Goths stepping up their raids into Roman territory following pullouts from northern outposts. While that comparison has obvious flaws, the psychology behind those raids and asymetrical attacks on U.S. soil are significantly more simmilar than Cold War containment/proxy wars versus pre-emtive warfare and stabilization operations. I'd be happy to entertain arguements, but that sort of thinking (i.e. Cold War type) is what keeps certain strategic factions within the Pentagon focused on China as the next emerging near-peer competitor. Sorry, the Manthorpe Curve is defunct, and it's time to define our world in much more complex terms than the zero sum game. This is more like playing the stock market than poker. Investments carry risks, but sometimes the riskiest investments can carry massive payoff. Last generations military decision makers were staring across a table at their opponent trying to guess what kind of hand he was holding. This generation's must be more like market analysts trying to determine what the payoff is and how long after investing before we call it a win or loss.
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